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Abstract. Distributed protocols should be robust to both benign malfunction (e.g. packet loss or delay) and attacks
(e.g. message replay). In this paper we take a formal approach to the automated synthesis of attackers, i.e. adver-
sarial processes that can cause the protocol to malfunction. Specifically, given a formal threat model capturing the
distributed protocol model and network topology, as well as the placement, goals, and interface (inputs and out-
puts)of potential attackers, we automatically synthesize an attacker. We formalize four attacker synthesis problems
- across attackers that always succeed versus those that sometimes fail, and attackers that may attack forever versus
those that may not - and we propose algorithmic solutions to two of them. We report on a prototype implementa-
tion called KORG and its application to TCP as a case-study. Our experiments show that KORG can automatically
generate well-known attacks for TCP within seconds or minutes.
Keywords: Synthesis · Security · Distributed Protocols
1 Introduction
Distributed protocols represent the fundamental communication backbone for all services over the Internet. Ensuring
the correctness and security of these protocols is critical for the services built on top of them [11]. Prior literature
proposed different approaches to correctness assurance, e.g. testing [32,14], or structural reasoning [13]. Many such
approaches rely on manual analysis or are ad-hoc in nature.
In this paper, we take a systematic approach to the problem of security of distributed protocols, by using formal
methods and synthesis [12]. Our focus is the automated generation of attacks. But what exactly is an attack? The notion
of an attack is often implicit in the formal verification of security properties: it is a counterexample violating some
security specification. We build on this idea. We provide a formal definition of threat models capturing the distributed
protocol model and network topology, as well as the placement, goals, and capabilities of potential attackers. Note
that an attacker goal is simply the negation of a protocol property, in the sense that the goal of an attacker is to violate
desirable properties that the protocol must preserve. Intuitively, an attacker is a process that, when composed with the
system, results a protocol property violation.
By formally defining attackers as processes, our approach has several benefits: first, we can ensure that these
processes are executable, meaning attackers are programs that reproduce attacks. This is in contrast to other approaches
that generate a trace exemplifying an attack, but not a program producing the attack, e.g. [7,49]. Second, an explicit
formal attacker definition allows us to distinguish different types of attackers, depending on: what exactly does it
mean to violate a property (in some cases? in all cases?); how the attacker can behave, etc. We distinguish between
∃-attackers (that sometimes succeed in violating the security property) and ∀-attackers (that always succeed); and
between attackers with recovery (that eventually revert to normal system behavior) and attackers without (that may
attack forever). We make four primary contributions.
– We propose a novel formalization of threat models and attackers, where the threat models algebraically capture not
only the attackers but also the attacker goals, the environmental and victim processes, and the network topology.
– We formalize four attacker synthesis problems – ∃ASP, R-∃ASP, ∀ASP, R-∀ASP – one for each of the four
combinations of types of attackers.
– We propose solutions for ∃ASP and R-∃ASP via reduction to model-checking. The key idea of our approach is to
replace the vulnerable processes - the victim(s) - by appropriate “gadgets”, then ask a model-checker whether the
resulting system violates a certain property.
– We implement our solutions in a prototype open-source tool called KORG, and apply KORG to TCP connection
establishment and tear-down routines. Our experiments show KORG is able to automatically synthesize realistic,
well-known attacks against TCP within seconds or minutes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present background material in Section 2. We define attacker
synthesis problems in Section 3 and present solutions in Section 4. We describe the TCP case study in Section 5,
present related work in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.
2 Formal Model Preliminaries
We model distributed protocols as interacting processes, in the spirit of [1]. We next define formally these processes
and their composition. We also define formally the specification language that we use, namely LTL. We use 2X to
denote the power-set ofX , and ω-exponentiation to denote infinite repetition, e.g., aω = aaa · · · .
2.1 Processes
Definition 1 (Process). A process is a tuple P = 〈AP, I, O, S, s0, T, L〉 with set of atomic propositions AP, set of
inputs I , set of outputs O, set of states S, initial state s0 ∈ S, transition relation T ⊆ S × (I ∪ O) × S, and (total)
labeling function L : S → 2AP, such that: AP, I, O, and S are finite; and I ∩O = ∅.
In formal methods, Kripke Structures [26] are commonly used to describe computer programs, because they are
automata (and so well-suited to describing computer programs) and their states are labeled with atomic propositions
(so they are well-suited to modal logic). A process is just a Kripke Structure with inputs and outputs. Using Kripke
Structures allows us to leverage LTL for free, and separating messages into inputs and outputs allows us to describe
network topologies entirely using just the interfaces of the interacting processes. This idea is fundamental to our
formalism of threat models in Section 4. We now explain the technical details of processes.
Let P = 〈AP, I, O, S, s0, T, L〉 be a process. For each state s ∈ S, L(s) is a subset of AP containing the atomic
propositions that are true at state s. Consider a transition (s, x, s′) starting at state s and ending at state s′ with label
x. If the label x is an input, then the transition is called an input transition and denoted s
x?
−→ s′. Otherwise, x is an
output, and the transition is called an output transition and denoted s
x!
−→ s′. A transition (s, x, s′) is called outgoing
from state s and incoming to state s′.
A state s ∈ S is called a deadlock iff it has no outgoing transitions. The state s is called reachable if either it is the
initial state or there exists a sequence of transitions
(
(si, xi, si+1)
)m
i=0
⊆ T starting at the initial state s0 and ending
at sm+1 = s. Otherwise, s is called unreachable. The state s is called input-enabled iff, for all inputs x ∈ I , there
exists some state s′ ∈ S such that there exists a transition (s, x, s′) ∈ T . We call s an input state (or output sate) if
all its outgoing transitions are input transitions (or output transitions, respectively). States with both outgoing input
transitions and outgoing output transitions are neither input nor output states, while states with no outgoing transitions
(i.e., deadlocks) are (vacuously) both input and output states.
Various definitions of process determinism exist; ours is a variation on that of [1]. A process P is deterministic
iff all of the following hold: (i) its transition relation T can be expressed as a function S × (I ∪ O) → S; (ii) every
non-deadlock state in S is either an input state or an output state, but not both; (iii) input states are input-enabled;
and (iv) each output state has only one outgoing transition. Determinism guarantees that: each state is a deadlock,
an input state, or an output state; when a process outputs, its output is uniquely determined by its state; and when a
process inputs, the input and state uniquely determine where the process transitions. More intuitively, deterministic
processes can be translated into concrete programs in languages like C or JAVA. Determinism therefore helps us make
our attackers realistic.
A run of a process P is an infinite sequence r =
(
(si, xi, si+1)
)∞
i=0
⊆ Tω of consecutive transitions. We use
runs(P ) to denote all the runs of P . A run over states s0, s1, ... induces a sequence of labels L(s0), L(s1), ... called
a computation. Given a (zero-indexed) sequence ν, we let ν[i] denote the ith element of ν; ν[i : j], where i ≤ j,
denote the finite infix (ν[t])jt=i; and ν[i :] denote the infinite postfix (ν[t])
∞
t=i; we will use this notation for runs and
computations.
Given two processes Pi = 〈APi, Ii, Oi, Si, si0, Ti, Li〉 for i = 1, 2, we say that P1 is a subprocess of P2, denoted
P1 ⊆ P2, if AP1 ⊆ AP2, I1 ⊆ I2, O1 ⊆ O2, S1 ⊆ S2, T1 ⊆ T2, and, for all s ∈ S1, L1(s) ⊆ L2(s).
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2.2 Composition
The composition of two processes P1 and P2 is another process denoted P1 ‖ P2, capturing both the individual
behaviors of P1 and P2 as well as their interactions with one another (e.g. Fig. 1). We define the asynchronous parallel
composition operator ‖ with rendezvous communication as in [1].
Definition 2 (Process Composition). Let Pi = 〈APi, Ii, Oi, Si, s
i
0, Ti, Li〉 be processes, for i = 1, 2. For the com-
position of P1 and P2 (denoted P1 ‖ P2) to be well-defined, the processes must have no common outputs, i.e.,
O1 ∩O2 = ∅, and no common atomic propositions, i.e., AP1 ∩ AP2 = ∅.
Then P1 ‖ P2 is defined below:
P1 ‖ P2 = 〈AP1 ∪ AP2, (I1 ∪ I2) \ (O1 ∪O2), O1 ∪O2, S1 × S2, (s
1
0, s
2
0), T, L〉 (1)
... where the transition relation T is precisely the set of transitions (s1, s2)
x
−→ (s′1, s
′
2) such that, for i = 1, 2, if the
label x ∈ Ii ∪Oi is a label of Pi, then si
x
−→ s′i ∈ Ti, else si = s
′
i. L : S1 × S2 → 2
AP1∪AP2 is the function defined as
L(s1, s2) = L1(s1) ∪ L2(s2).
Intuitively, we define process composition to capture two primary ideas: (1) rendezvous communication, meaning
that a message is sent at the same time that it is received, and (2) multi-casting, meaning that a single message could
be sent to multiple parties at once. We can use so-called channel processes to build asynchronous communication
out of rendezvous communication (as we do in Section 5), and we can easily preclude multi-casting by manipulating
process interfaces. Our definition therefore allows for a variety of communicationmodels, making it flexible for diverse
research problems. We next explain and illustrate the technical details.
A state of the composite process P1 ‖ P2 is a pair (s1, s2) consisting of a state s1 ∈ S1 of P1 and a state s2 ∈ S2
of P2. The initial state of P1 ‖ P2 is a pair (s10, s
2
0) consisting of the initial state s
1
0 of P1 and the initial state s
2
0 of P2.
The inputs of the composite process are all the inputs of P1 that are not outputs of P2, and all the inputs of P2 that are
not outputs of P1. The outputs of the composite process are the outputs of the individual processes. P1 ‖ P2 has three
kinds of transitions (s1, s2)
z
−→ (s′1, s
′
2). In the first case, P1 may issue an output z. If this output z is an input of P2,
then P1 and P2 move simultaneously and P1 ‖ P2 outputs z. Otherwise, P1 moves, outputting z, but P2 stays still (so
s2 = s
′
2). The second case is symmetric to the first, except that P2 issues the output. In the third case, z is neither an
output for P1 nor for P2. If z is an input for both, then they synchronize. Otherwise, whichever process has z as an
input moves, while the other stays still.
s0 : ∅
s1 :
{p, q}
s2 :
{q}
x?
x?
z?
v!
w!
‖ q0 : {r} q1 : ∅
x!
w?
m! =
(s0, q0) :
{r}
(s1, q0) :
{p, q, r}
(s2, q0) :
{q, r}
(s0, q1) :
∅
(s1, q1) :
{p, q}
(s2, q1) :
{q}
z?
x!
v!
w! v!
x!
z?
m! m! m!
Fig. 1: Left is a process P with atomic propositions AP = {p, q}, inputs I = {x, z}, outputs O = {v, w},
states S = {s0, s1, s2}, transition relation T = {(s0, w, s0), (s0, x, s1), (s0, z, s1), (s2, x, s1), (s2, v, s2)}, and la-
beling function L where L(s0) = ∅, L(s1) = {p, q}, and L(s2) = {q}. Center is a process Q =
〈{r}, {w}, {x,m}, {q0, q1}, q0, {(q0, x, q1), (q1,m, q1), (q1, w, q0)}, LQ〉 where LQ(q0) = {r} and LQ(q1) = ∅. Processes
P and Q have neither common atomic propositions ({p, q} ∩ {r} = ∅), nor common outputs ({w, v} ∩ {x,m} = ∅), so the
composition P ‖ Q is well-defined. Right is the process P ‖ Q. Although P ‖ Q is rather complicated, its only reachable states
are (s0, q0), (s1, q0), and (s1, q1), and its only run is r =
(
(s0, q0), x, (s1, q1)
)
,
(
(s1, q1),m, (s1, q1)
)ω
. Non-obviously, the only
computation of P ‖ Q is σ = {r}, {p, q}ω .
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Note that sometimes rendezvous composition is defined to match s1
z?
−→ s′1 with s2
z!
−→ s′2 to form a silent
transition (s1, s2) −→ (s′1, s
′
2), but with our definition the output is preserved, so the composite transition would be
(s1, s2)
z!
−→ (s′1, s
′
2). This allows formulti-casting, where an output event of one process can synchronizewith multiple
input events from multiple other processes. It also means there are no silent transitions.
The labeling function L is total as L1 and L2 are total. Since we required the processes P1, P2 to have disjoint
sets of atomic propositions, L does not change the logic of the two processes under composition. Additionally, ‖ is
commutative and associative [1].
2.3 LTL
LTL [34] is a linear temporal logic for reasoning about computations. In this work, we use LTL to formulate properties
of processes. The syntax of LTL is defined by the following grammar:
φ ::= p | q | ...︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈AP
| φ1 ∧ φ2 | ¬φ1 | Xφ1 | φ1Uφ2 (2)
... where p, q, ... ∈ AP can be any atomic propositions, and φ1, φ2 can be any LTL formulae. Let σ be a computation
of a process P . If an LTL formula φ is true about σ, we write σ |= φ. On the other hand, if ¬(σ |= φ), then we write
σ 6|= φ. The semantics of LTL with respect to σ are as follows.
σ |= p iff p ∈ σ[0]
σ |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff σ |= φ1 and σ |= φ2
σ |= ¬φ1 iff σ 6|= φ1
σ |= Xφ1 iff σ[1 :] |= φ1
σ |= φ1Uφ2 iff
(
∃K ≥ 0 : σ[K :] |= φ2, and
∀ 0 ≤ j < K : σ[j :] |= φ1
)
(3)
Essentially, p holds iff it holds at the first step of the computation; the conjunction of two formulae holds if both
formulae hold; the negation of a formula holds if the formula does not hold; Xφ1 holds if φ1 holds in the next step
of the computation; and φ1Uφ2 holds if φ2 holds at some future step of the computation, and until then, φ1 holds.
Standard syntactic sugar include ∨, true, false, F, G, and →. For all LTL formulae φ1, φ2 and atomic propositions
p ∈ AP: φ1 ∨ φ2 ≡ ¬(¬φ1 ∧ ¬φ2); true ≡ p ∨ ¬p; false ≡ ¬true; Fφ1 ≡ trueUφ1; Gφ1 ≡ ¬F¬φ1; and
φ1 → φ2 ≡ (¬φ1) ∨ (φ1 ∧ φ2).
Example formulae include:
– Lunch will be ready in a moment:Xlunch-ready.
– I always eventually sleep:GFsleep.
– I am hungry until I eat: hungryUeat.
– A and B are never simultaneously in their crit states: G¬(critA ∧ critB).
An LTL formula φ is called a safety property iff it can be violated by a finite prefix of a computation, or a liveness
property iff it can only be violated by an infinite computation [3]. For a process P and LTL formula φ, we write
P |= φ iff, for every computation σ of P , σ |= φ. For convenience, we naturally elevate our notation for satisfaction
on computations to satisfaction on runs, that is, for a run r of a process P inducing a computation σ, we write r |= φ
and say “r satisfies φ” iff σ |= φ, or write r 6|= φ and say “r violates φ” iff σ 6|= φ.
3 Attacker Synthesis Problems
We want to synthesize attackers automatically. Intuitively, an attacker is a process that, when composed with the
system, violates some property. There are different types of attackers, depending on what it means to violate a property
(in some cases? in all cases?), as well as on the system topology (threat model). Next, we define the threat model and
attacker concepts formally, followed by the problems considered in this paper.
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3.1 Threat Models
A threat model or attacker model prosaically captures the goals and capabilities of an attacker with respect to some
victim and environment.Algebraically, it is difficult to capture the attacker goals and capabilities without also capturing
the victim and the environment, so our abstract threat model includes all of the above. Our threat model captures: how
many attacker components there are; how they communicate with each other and with the rest of the system: what
messages they can intercept, transmit, etc; and the attacker goals. We formalize the concept of a threat model in what
follows.
Definition 3 (Input-Output Interface). An input-output interface is a tuple (I, O) such that I∩O = ∅ and I∪O 6= ∅.
The class of an input-output interface (I, O), denoted C(I, O), is the set of processes with inputs I and outputs O.
Likewise, C(P ) denotes the input-output interface the process P belongs to. (e.g. Fig. 3)
Definition 4 (Threat Model). A threat model is a tuple (P, (Qi)
m
i=0, φ) where P,Q0, ..., Qm are processes, each
processQi has no atomic propositions (i.e., its set of atomic propositions is empty), and φ is an LTL formula such that
P ‖ Q0 ‖ ... ‖ Qm |= φ. We also require that the system P ‖ Q0 ‖ ... ‖ Qm satisfies the formula φ in a non-trivial
manner, that is, that P ‖ Q0 ‖ ... ‖ Qm has at least one infinite run.
In a threat model, the process P is called the target process, and the processesQi are called vulnerable processes.
The goal of the adversary is to modify the vulnerable processesQi so that composition with the target process violates
φ. (We assume that prior to the attack, the protocol behaves correctly, i.e., it satisfies φ.) For example, in TM1 of Fig. 2,
the target process is Alice composed with Bob, and the vulnerable processes are Oscar and Trudy, while in TM5, the
target process is the composition of Jacob, Simon, Sophia, and Juan, and the only vulnerable process is Isabelle.
Alice Mallory Bob
TM3 = (Alice ‖ Bob, (Mallory), φ3)
Alice
Eve
Mark
TM4 = (Alice ‖ Mark, (Eve), φ4)
Alice Oscar
TM2 = (Alice, (Oscar), φ2)
Alice
Trudy
Oscar
Bob
TM1 = (Alice ‖ Bob, (Oscar,Trudy), φ1)
Simon
Jacob
Juan
Sophia
Isabelle
TM5 = (Jacob ‖ Simon ‖ Sophia ‖ Juan, (Isabelle), φ5)
Fig. 2: Example Threat Models. The properties φi are not shown. Solid and dashed boxes are processes; we only assume the
adversary can exploit the processes in the dashed boxes. TM1 describes a distributed on-path attacker scenario, TM2 describes
an off-path attacker, TM3 is a classical man-in-the-middle scenario, and TM4 describes a one-directional man-in-the middle, or,
depending on the problem formulation, an eavesdropper. TM5 is a threat model with a distributed victim where the attacker cannot
affect or read messages from Simon to Juan. Note that a directed edge in a network topology from Node 1 to Node 2 is logically
equivalent to the statement that a portion of the outputs of Node 1 are also inputs to Node 2. In cases where the same packet might be
sent to multiple recipients, the sender and recipient can be encoded in a message subscript. Therefore, the entire network topology
is implicit in the interfaces of the processes in the threat model according to the composition definition.
3.2 Attackers
Definition 5 (Attacker). Let TM = (P, (Qi)
m
i=0, φ) be a threat model. Then A = (Ai)
m
i=0 is called a TM-attacker if
P ‖ A0 ‖ ... ‖ Am 6|= φ, and, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m: Ai is a deterministic process; Ai has no atomic propositions, and
Ai ∈ C(Qi).
The existence of a (P, (Qi)
m
i=0, φ)-attacker means that if an adversary can exploit all the Qi, then the adversary
can attack P with respect to φ. Note that an attacker A cannot succeed by blocking the system from having any runs
at all. Indeed, P ‖ A0 ‖ ... ‖ Am 6|= φ implies that P ‖ A0 ‖ ... ‖ Am has at least one infinite run violating φ.
5
Real-world computer programs implemented in languages like C or JAVA are called concrete, while logical models
of those programs implemented as algebraic transition systems such as processes are called abstract. The motivation
for synthesizing abstract attackers is ultimately to recover exploitation strategies that actually work against concrete
protocols. So, we should be able to translate an abstract attacker (Fig. 3) into a concrete one (Fig. 11). Determinism
guarantees that we can do this. We also require the attacker and the vulnerable processes to have no atomic proposi-
tions, so the attacker cannot “cheat” by directly changing the truth-hood of the property it aims to violate.
We can define an attacker for many properties at once by conjoining those properties (e.g. φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ φ3), or for
many processes at once by composing those processes (e.g. P1 ‖ P2 ‖ P3). We therefore do not lose expressibility
compared to a definition that explicitly allows many properties or processes.
For a given threat model many attackers may exist. We want to differentiate attacks that are more effective from
attacks that are less effective. One straightforward comparison is to partition attackers into those that always violate φ,
and those that only sometimes violate φ. We formalize this notion with ∃-attackers and ∀-attackers.
Definition 6 (∃-Attacker vs ∀-Attacker). Let A be a (P, (Qi)mi=0, φ)-attacker. Then A is a ∀-attacker if P ‖ A0 ‖
... ‖ Am |= ¬φ. Otherwise, A is an ∃-attacker.
A ∀-attacker A always succeeds, because P ‖ A |= ¬φ means that every behavior of P ‖ A satisfies ¬φ, that
is, every behavior of P ‖ A violates φ. Since P ‖ A 6|= φ, there must exist a computation σ of P ‖ A such that
σ |= ¬φ, so, a ∀-attacker cannot succeed by blocking. An ∃-attacker is any attacker that is not a ∀-attacker, and every
attacker succeeds in at least one computation, so an ∃-attacker sometimes succeeds, and sometimes does not. In most
real-world systems, infinite attacks are impossible, implausible, or just uninteresting. To avoid such attacks, we define
an attacker that produces finite-length sequences of adversarial behavior, and then “recovers”, meaning that it behaves
like the vulnerable process it replaced (see Fig. 4).
Definition 7 (Attacker with Recovery). Let A be a (P, (Qi)
m
i=0, φ)-attacker. If, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ m, the attacker
componentAi consists of a finite directed acyclic graph (DAG) ending in the initial state of the vulnerable processQi,
followed by all of the vulnerable process Qi, then we say the attacker A is an attacker with recovery. We refer to the
Qi postfix of each Ai as its recovery , as in Fig. 3, A3. Intuitively, the vulnerable process is appended to the attacker.
Note that researchers sometimes use “recovery” to mean when a system undoes the damage caused by an attack.
We use the word differently, to mean when the property φ remains violated even under modus operandi subsequent to
attack termination.
p0 : {OK} p1 : ∅
a?
c?
b?
c?
a?, b?, c?
q0
a!
a10
b!
a20
c!
A3
DAG
Q
a30
q0
b!
a!
Fig. 3: From left to right: processes P , Q, A1, A2, A3. Let φ = GOK, and let the interface of Q be C(Q) = (∅, {a, b, c}). Then
P ‖ Q |= φ. A1 and A2 are both deterministic and have no input states. Let C(A1) = C(A2) = C(Q). Then, A1 and A2 are both
(P, (Q), φ)-attackers. A1 is a ∀-attacker, and A2 is an ∃-attacker. A3 is a ∀-attacker with recovery consisting of a DAG starting at
a30 and ending at the initial state q0 ofQ, plus all of Q, namely the recovery.
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Ai
DAG
Qiai0
ai1
ai2
ai3
x0
x1
x2
x3
...
...
...
...
...
x4
x5
x6
x7
x8
x9
x10
qi0
xk
xk+1
xk+2
xk+3
xk+4
Fig. 4: Suppose A = (Ai)
m
i=0 is attacker with recovery for TM = (P, (Ai)
m
i=0, φ). Further suppose Ai has initial state a
i
0, and Qi
has initial state qi0. ThenAi should consist of a DAG starting at a
i
0 and ending at q
i
0, plus all ofQi, called the recovery, indicated by
the shaded blob. Note that if some Qi is non-deterministic, then there can be no attacker with recovery, because Qi is a subprocess
of Ai, and all the Ais must be deterministic in order for A to be an attacker.
3.3 Attacker Synthesis Problems
Each type of attacker - ∃ versus ∀, with recovery versus without - naturally induces a synthesis problem.
Problem 1 (∃-Attacker Synthesis Problem (∃ASP)). Given a threat model TM, find a TM-attacker, if one exists; oth-
erwise state that none exists.
Problem 2 (Recovery ∃-Attacker Synthesis Problem (R-∃ASP)). Given a threat model TM, find a TM-attacker with
recovery, if one exists; otherwise state that none exists.
We defined ∃ and ∀-attackers to be disjoint, but, if the goal is to find an ∃-attacker, then surely a ∀-attacker is
acceptable too; we therefore did not restrict the ∃-problems to only ∃-attackers. Next we define the two ∀-problems,
which remain for future work.
Problem 3 (∀-Attacker Synthesis Problem (∀ASP)). Given a threat model TM, find a TM-∀-attacker, if one exists;
otherwise state that none exists.
Problem 4 (Recovery ∀-Attacker Synthesis Problem (R-∀ASP)).Given a threat model TM, find a TM-∀-attacker with
recovery, if one exists; otherwise state that none exists.
4 Solutions
We present solutions ∃ASP and R-∃ASP for any number of attackers, and for both safety and liveness properties. Our
success criteria are soundness and completeness. Both solutions are polynomial in the product of the size of P and the
sizes of the interfaces of the Qis, and exponential in the size of the property φ [45]. For real-world performance, see
Section 5.
We reduce ∃ASP and R-∃ASP to model-checking. The idea is to replace the vulnerable processes Qi with appro-
priate “gadgets”, then ask a model-checker whether the system violates a certain property. We prove that existence
of a violation (a counterexample) is equivalent to existence of an attacker, and we show how to transform the coun-
terexample into an attacker. The gadgets and the LTL formula are different, depending on whether we seek attackers
without or with recovery.
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4.1 Gadgetry
We begin by defining lassos and bad prefixes. A computation σ is a lasso if it equals a finite word α, then infinite
repetition of a finite word β, i.e., σ = α · βω. A prefix α of a computation σ is called a bad prefix for P and φ if P
has ≥ 1 runs inducing computations starting with α, and every computation starting with α violates φ. We naturally
elevate the terms lasso and bad prefix to runs and their prefixes. We assume a model checker: a procedure MC(P, φ)
that takes as input a process P and property φ, and returns ∅ if P |= φ, or one or more violating lasso runs or bad
prefixes of runs for P and φ, otherwise [3].
Attackers cannot have atomic propositions. So, the only way for A to attack TM is by sending and receiving
messages, hence the space of attacks is within the space of labeled transition sequences. The Daisy Process nondeter-
ministically exhausts the space of input and output events of a vulnerable process.
Definition 8 (Daisy Process). Let Q = 〈∅, I, O, S, s0, T, L〉 be a process with no atomic propositions. Then the daisy
of Q, denoted DAISY(Q), is the process defined below, where L′ : {d0} → {∅} is the map such that L′(d0) = ∅.
DAISY(Q) = 〈∅, I, O, {d0}, d0, {(d0, w, d0) | w ∈ I ∪O}, L
′〉 (4)
d0
i? for i ∈ I
o! for o ∈ O
Fig. 5: DAISY(Q) has transitions d0
i?
−→ d0 and d0
o!
−→ d0 for each i ∈ I and o ∈ O. So ifQ has a run s0
m0−−→ s1
m1−−→ s2
m2−−→ ...,
then DAISY(Q) must have an I/O-equivalent run d0
m0−−→ d0
m1−−→ d0
m2−−→ .... In other words, DAISY(Q) can do everything Q can
do, and more.
Next, we define a Daisy with Recovery. This gadget is an abstract process, i.e., a generalized process with a non-
empty set of initial states S0 ⊆ S. Composition and LTL semantics for abstract processes are naturally defined. We
implicitly transform processes to abstract processes by wrapping the initial state in a set.
Definition 9 (Daisy with Recovery). Given a process Qi = 〈∅, I, O, S, s0, T, L〉, the daisy with recovery of Qi,
denoted RDAISY(Qi), is the abstract process RDAISY(Qi) = 〈AP, I, O, S′, S0, T ′, L′〉, with atomic propositions
AP = {recoveri}, states S
′ = S ∪ {d0}, initial states S0 = {s0, d0}, transitions T
′ = T ∪ {(d0, x, w0) | x ∈
I ∪O,w0 ∈ S0}, and labeling function L′ : S′ → 2AP that takes s0 to {recoveri} and other states to ∅. (We reserve
the symbols recover0, ... for use in daisies with recovery, so they cannot be sub-formulae of the property in any
threat model.)
The daisy with recovery gadget is illustrated in Fig. 6.
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Qi
d0 : ∅
i? for i ∈ I
o! for o ∈ O s0 : {recoveri}
i? for i ∈ I
o! for o ∈ O
Fig. 6: RDAISY(Qi) is the result of (1) directly connecting DAISY(Qi) to the initial state ofQi in every possible way, (2) allowing
both the initial state of the daisy and the initial state of Qi to be initial states of the abstract process, and (3) adding a single atomic
proposition recoveri to the initial state of Qi.
4.2 Solution to ∃ASP
Let TM = (P, (Qi)
m
i=0, φ) be a threat model. Our goal is to find an attacker for TM, if one exists, or state that none
exists, otherwise. First, we check whether the system P ‖ DAISY(Q0) ‖ ... ‖ DAISY(Qm) satisfies φ. If it does, then
no attacker exists, as the daisy processes encompass any possible attacker behavior. Define a set R returned by the
model-checker MC:
R = MC(P ‖ DAISY(Q0) ‖ ... ‖ DAISY(Qm), φ) (5)
If R = ∅ then no attacker exists.
Solution to ∃ASP (Pseudocode)
1. R← MC(P ‖ DAISY(Q0) ‖ ... ‖ DAISY(Qm), φ)
2. If (R = ∅) then return “no TM-attacker exists”
On the other hand, if the system violates φ, then we can transform a violating run into a set of attacker processes
by projecting it onto the corresponding interfaces. Choose a violating run or bad prefix r ∈ R arbitrarily. Either r = α
is some finite bad prefix, or r = α · βω is a violating lasso. For each 0 ≤ i ≤ m, let αi be the projection of α onto the
process DAISY(Qi). That is, let αi = []; then for each (s, x, s
′) in α, if x is an input or an output of Qi, and q, q
′ are
the states DAISY(Qi) embodies in s, s
′, add (q, x, q′) to αi.
3. Choose r ∈ R arbitrarily.
4. Either r = α · βω is a lasso, or r = α is a bad prefix.
5. (αi)
m
i=0 ← ([])
m
i=0
6.A ← (⊥)mi=0
7. For 0 ≤ i ≤ m do
7.1.—— For 0 ≤ j < |α| do
7.1.1.———— (s, x, s′) ← α[j]
7.1.2.———— If (x ∈ Ii ∪Oi) then αi.append((s[i], x, s′[i]))
For each αi, create an incomplete process A
α
i with a new state s
α
j+1 and transition s
α
j
z
−→ sαj+1 for each αi[j] =
(di0, z, d
i
0) for 0 ≤ j < |αi|. If r = α · β
ω is a lasso, then for each 0 ≤ i ≤ m, define Aβi from βi in the same way that
we defined Aαi from αi; let A
′
i be the result of merging the first and last states of A
β
i with the last state of A
α
i .
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7.2.—— Create a new state sαi0
7.3.—— Si ← {s
αi
0 }
7.4.—— Ti ← ∅
7.5.—— For 0 ≤ j < |αi| do
7.5.1.———— ( , z, ) ← αi[j]
7.5.2.———— Create a new state sαij+1
7.5.3.———— Si.append(s
αi
j+1)
7.5.4.———— Ti.append((s
αi
j , z, s
αi
j+1))
7.6.—— Let Li : Si → 2∅ denote the function λs.∅
7.7.—— Aαi ← 〈∅, Ii, Oi, Si, Ti, Li〉
7.8.—— If (r = α · βω is a lasso) then
7.8.1.———— Define βi from β in the same way we defined αi from α in 7.1
7.8.2.———— Define A
β
i = 〈∅, Ii, Oi, S
β
i , T
β
i , L
β
i 〉 from βi as we defined A
α
i from αi in 7.2-7.6
7.8.3.———— Ai ← Aαi glued to A
β
i where we merge A
α
i ’s final state s
αi
|αi|
with A
β
i ’s initial state s
βi
0
Otherwise, if r = α is a bad prefix, let A′i be the result of adding an input self-loop to the last state of A
α
i , or an
output self-loop if Qi has no inputs. Either way, A
′
i is an incomplete attacker. Finally let Ai be the result of making
every input state in A′i input-enabled via self-loops, and return the attackerA = (Ai)
m
i=0.
7.9.—— Else if (Ii 6= ∅) then
7.9.1.———— Ai ← the result of adding a single arbitrary input self-loop to the final state s
αi
|αi|
of Aαi
7.10.—— Else Ai ← the result of adding a single arbitrary output self-loop to the final state s
αi
|αi|
of Aαi
7.11.—— For s ∈ states(Ai) do
7.11.1.———— If s is an input state then For x ∈ Ii do transitions(Ai).append((s, x, s))
8. returnA
An illustration of the method is given in Figure 7.
Theorem 1 (∃ASP Solution is Sound and Complete). Let TM = (P, (Qi)mi=0, φ) be a threat model, and defineR as
in Eqn. 5. Then the following hold. 1)R 6= ∅ iff a TM-attacker exists. 2) IfR 6= ∅, then the procedure above eventually
returns a TM-attacker.
Sketch of Proof. We prove 2) then 1). Suppose r ∈ R. Processes are finite and threat models are finitely large, so the
procedure eventually terminates. We need to show the result A = (Ai)
m
i=0 is a TM-attacker. Showing the result is
deterministic is straightforward, and it should be equally clear that eachAi has the same interface as its respectiveQi.
We inductively demonstrate that P ‖ A0 ‖ ... ‖ Am has some run r′ that is I/O-equivalent to the run r and induces the
same computation. So then r′ 6|= φ, so A is a TM-attacker and therefore 2) holds.
We now turn our attention to 1). If a TM-attackerA′ exists, then P ‖ A′0 ‖ ... ‖ A
′
m has a run r violating φ. The
daisies can do everything the Qis can do and more, so the daisies yield some I/O-equivalent run r
′ violating φ, and so
R 6= ∅. On the other hand, if R = ∅ then we can easily prove by way of contradiction that no attacker exists, since
attackers, daisies, and vulnerable processes have no atomic propositions, and therefore any violating run of an attacker
with P could be translated into an I/O-equivalent run of the daises with P inducing the same computation. So 1) holds
and we are done.
4.3 Solution to R-∃ASP
Let TM = (P, (Qi)
m
i=0, φ) be a threat model as before. Now our goal is to find a TM-attacker with recovery, if one
exists, or state that none exists, otherwise. The idea to solve this problem is similar to the idea for finding attackers
without recovery, with two differences. First, the daisy processes are now more complicated, and include recovery
to the original Qi processes. Second, the formula used in model-checking is not φ, but a more complex formula ψ to
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Threat Model: TM′ = (P, (Q0, Q1), φ), where the processes from left to right are P , Q0, and Q1, and where φ = FG l.
P has inputs k and m, and output n. Q0 has no inputs, and output m. Q1 has inputs n and h, and output k. Recall that
P ‖ Q0 ‖ Q1 |= φ.
p0 : ∅ p1 : ∅ p2 : ∅ p3 : {l}
k? m?
m?
k?
n!
q00
m!
q10 q
1
1
n?
k! k!
Violating run: A run r ∈ R where R is defined as in Equation 5.
r =
α︷ ︸︸ ︷
p0d00
d10

 k!−→

p1d00
d10

 m!−−→
βω︷ ︸︸ ︷
p2d00
d10

 m!−−→

p3d00
d10

 n!−→

p2d00
d10

 m!−−→

p3d00
d10

 n!−→ ... ∈ R
Application of solution: r is projected and translated into an attacker A = (A0, A1).
α0 = d00 d
0
0
Aα0 = s
α0
0 s
α0
1
m!
m!
α1 = d10 d
1
0
Aα1 = s
α1
0 s
α1
1
k!
k!
β0 = d00 d
0
0
A
β
0 = s
β0
0 s
β0
1
m!
m!
β1 = d10 d
1
0
A
β
1 = s
β1
0 s
β1
1
n?
n?
A′0 = a0
′
0 a
0′
1
m!
m!
A0 = a00 a
0
1
m!
m!
A′1 = a1
′
0 a
1′
1
k!
n?
A1 = a10 a
1
1
k!
n?, h?
Fig. 7: Illustration of solution to ∃ASP. Example threat model TM′ on top, followed by a violating run inR, followed by translation
of the run into attacker.
ensure that the attacker eventually recovers, i.e., all the attacker components eventually recover.We define the property
ψ so that in prose it says “if all daisies eventually recover, then φ holds”. We then define R like before, except we
replace daisies with daisies with recovery, and φ with ψ, as defined below.
ψ =
( ∧
0≤i≤m
Frecoveri
)
=⇒ φ (6)
R = MC(P ‖ RDAISY(Q0) ‖ ... ‖ RDAISY(Qm), ψ) (7)
If R = ∅ then no attacker with recovery exists. If any Qi is not deterministic, then likewise no attacker with
recovery exists, because our attacker definition requires the attacker to be deterministic, but if Qi is not and Qi ⊆ Ai
then neither is Ai.
Solution to R-∃ASP (Pseudocode)
1. R← MC(P ‖ RDAISY(Q0) ‖ ... ‖ RDAISY(Qm), ((
∧
0≤i≤m Frecoveri) =⇒ φ))
2. If (R = ∅ or anyQi is not deterministic) then return “no TM-attacker exists”
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Otherwise, choose a violating run (or bad prefix) r ∈ R arbitrarily. We proceed as we did for ∃ASP but with three
key differences. First, we define αi by projecting α onto RDAISY(Qi) as opposed to DAISY(Qi). Second, for each
0 ≤ i ≤ m, instead of using Aβi if r is a lasso, or adding self-loops to the final state if r is a bad prefix, we simply glue
Aαi to Qi by setting the last state of A
α
i to be the initial state of Qi. (The result of gluing is a process; the initial state
of Aαi is its only initial state.) Third, instead of using self-loops to input-enable input states, we use input transitions
to the initial state of Qi. This ensures the pre-recovery portion is a DAG. Then we returnA = (Ai)
m
i=0.
/* lines 3. through 7.7. of ∃ASP Solution */
7.8.—— For (s, x) ∈ input-states(Aαi )× Ii do transitions(A
α
i ).append((s, x, s
αi
|αi|
))
7.9.—— Ai ← the result of gluingQi to A
α
i , as we glued A
β
i to A
α
i in 7.8.3. of ∃ASP Solution.
8. returnA
Lemma 1 (Attackers with Recovery induce Violating Runs with Recovery). Let TM = (P, (Qi)
m
i=0, φ) be a threat
model and A a TM-attacker with recovery. Define ψ as in Equation 6. Let r ∈ runs(P ‖ A0 ‖ ... ‖ Am) be a run
such that r 6|= φ. Then there exists a run r′ ∈ runs(P ‖ RDAISY(Q0) ‖ ... ‖ RDAISY(Qm)) such that r′ 6|= ψ.
Proof. Define TM, ψ, r as in the problem statement. Let S1 = P ‖ A0 ‖ ... ‖ Am and S2 = P ‖ RDAISY(Q0) ‖ ... ‖
RDAISY(Qm). We need to show there exists a run r
′ ∈ runs(S2) such that r′ 6|= ψ.
Let τ0 = (s, x, s
′) be the first transition in r. Consider the transition τn = r[n] with label xn. Let sn be the final
state of τ ′n−1 if n > 0, or the initial state of S2 otherwise. Let τ
′
n be the transition of S2 beginning at sn defined
according to the following rules.
i. If P transitions in τn, then P performs the same transition in τ
′
n. Otherwise, P stays still in τ
′
n.
ii. If Ai never transitions in r, then no transition in r can have a label in the interface of Ai according to our
composition definition. ButAi,Qi, and RDAISY(Qi) all have the same interface. So then we just let RDAISY(Qi)
stay still in the initial state qi0 of its recovery in τ
′
n, where it satisfies recoveri.
iii. Else, if Ai transitions in τn after recovering, then RDAISY(Qi) takes the same transition in τ
′
n as Ai does in τn.
iv. Else, if Ai transitions in τn, and either this transition ends in recovery for Ai or after this transition Ai stays still
forever in r, then RDAISY(Qi) performs a transition with label xn from the initial state d
i
0 of its daisy to q
i
0.
v. Else, if Ai transitions in τn, and the previous case does not hold, then RDAISY(Qi) performs a self-loop with
label xn on d
i
0.
Let r′ =
∏
j≥0 τ
′
j . As each τ
′
j is a valid transition of S2 beginning at the final state of τ
′
j−1, or at the initial state of
S2 if j = 0, considering our composition definition, it inductively follows that r
′ is a run of S2. By the finitude of
the DAGs in the Ai: in r, all the Ai either recover, or eventually stay still forever. Each RDAISY(Qi) recovers in the
same step of r′ where Ai either recovers or stops moving in r, according to iv., or begins in recovery, according to ii.
Therefore r′ |= Frecoveri for each 0 ≤ i ≤ m. And since P embodies the same sequence of transitions in r as it
does in r′, the two runs induce the same computation. Therefore r′ 6|= φ. So r′ is a run of S2 violating ψ and we are
done.
Theorem 2 (R-∃ASP Solution is Sound and Complete). Let TM = (P, (Qi)mi=0, φ) be a threat model, and defineR
as in Eqn. 7. Assume all the Qis are deterministic. Then the following hold. 1) R 6= ∅ iff a TM-attacker with recovery
exists. 2) If R 6= ∅, then the procedure described above eventually returns a TM-attacker with recovery.
Sketch of Proof. We prove (1) then (2). First assume R 6= ∅. An attacker must exist, by basically the same logic we
used in proving Theorem 1 with the additional step of observing that ¬ψ =⇒ ¬φ. Second, this attacker must have
recovery, as in order to violate ψ it must satisfy (Frecover0) ∧ ... ∧ (Frecoverm). This suffices to prove (1)
left-to-right. Now discard our prior assumption, and instead assume an attacker with recovery A = (Ai)
m
i=0 exists.
By Definition 7, P ‖ A0 ‖ ... ‖ Am has a run r violating φ. Then Lemma 1 implies R 6= ∅ so (1) holds right-to-left.
Therefore (1) holds and we may proceed to (2).
AssumeR 6= ∅ and let r ∈ R be the run selected by the procedure. The solution terminates, and returns a sequence
of processes (Ai)
m
i=0. If r = α · β
ω is a lasso then logically the lasso portion must happen in recovery, as the DAG
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is finite and acyclic and r is a run so it captures both states and labeled transitions between them. In this case clearly
P ‖ A0 ‖ ... ‖ Am has a run r violating ψ. On the other hand, if r = α is a bad prefix, then we need only show that
P ‖ A0 ‖ ... ‖ Am has a run r′ with a prefix that is I/O-equivalent to α, and this follows from basically the same
logic as we used in proving Theorem 1. Moreover, the determinism of the Ais follows neatly from the determinism of
the Qis and the logic used in proving Theorem 1. That each Ai has the same interface as its respective Qi should be
obvious. So A is an attacker with recovery and we are done.
5 Case Study: TCP
Below we first describe our implementation then the details of our case study (TCP).
Implementation We implemented our solutions in an open-source tool called KORG1. We say an attacker A for
a threat model TM = (P, (Qi)
m
i=0, φ) is a centralized attacker if m = 0, or a distributed attacker, otherwise. In
other words, a centralized attacker has only one attacker component A = (A), whereas a distributed attacker has
many attacker components A = (Ai)
m
i=0. KORG handles ∃ASP and R-∃ASP for liveness and safety properties for
a centralized attacker. KORG is implemented in PYTHON 3 and uses the model-checker SPIN [17] as its underlying
verification engine.
Attacker: Centralized Distributed
Recovery? ∃ Problem ∀ Problem ∃ Problem ∀ Problem
With X ✗ ✗ ✗
Without X ✗ ✗ ✗
Table 1: X or ✗ denote if the solution to a problem is or is not implemented in KORG, for both liveness and safety properties.
TCP is a fundamental Internet protocol consisting of three stages: connection establishment, data transfer, and
connection tear-down.We focus on the first and third stages, which jointly we call the connection routine. Our approach
and model (see Fig. 8, 9) are inspired by SNAKE [21]. Run-times and results are listed in Table 2.
PEER 1
1TON
NTO1
NETWORK
2TON
NTO2
PEER 2
Fig. 8: TCP threat model block diagram. Each box is a process. An arrow from process P1 to process P2 denotes that a subset of
the outputs of P2 are exclusively inputs of P1. PEERs 1 and 2 are TCP peers. A channel is a directed FIFO queue of size one with
the ability to detect fullness. A full channel may be overwritten. 1TON, NTO1, 2TON, and NTO2 are channels. Implicitly, channels
relabel: for instance, 1TON relabels outputs from PEER 1 to become inputs of NETWORK; NETWORK transfers messages between
peers via channels, and is the vulnerable process.
Threat Models We use channels to build asynchronous communication out of direct (rendezvous) communication.
Rather than communicating directly with the NETWORK, the peers communicate with the channels, and the channels
communicate with the NETWORK, allowing us to model the fact that packets are not instantaneously transferred in the
wild. We use the shorthand CHAN!MSG to denote the event where MSG is sent over a channel CHAN; it is contextually
1 Named after the Korg microKORG synthesizer, with its dedicated “attack” control on Knob 3. Code and models are freely and
openly available at https://github.com/maxvonhippel/AttackerSynthesis.
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clear who sent or received the message. TCP exists in the Transport Layer of the internet, an upper layer reliant on the
lower Link Layer and Internet Layer. We abstract the lower network stack layer TCP relies on with NETWORK, which
passes messages between 1TON ‖ 2TON and NTO1 ‖ NTO2. We model the peers symmetrically.
Closed End
Listen
SYN Sent
i0
i1
i2
SYN Received
Established i3
FINWait 1
Close Wait
FINWait 2
i4
Closing
i5
Time Wait
Last ACK
SND!SYN
RCV?SYN ACK
RCV?SYN
RCV?SYN
SND!ACK
SND!ACK
SND!SYN ACK
RCV?ACK
RCV?FIN
SND!FIN
RCV?ACK
RCV?FIN
SND!ACK
SND!FIN
SND!ACK
RCV?FIN
SND!ACK
RCV?ACK
RCV?ACK
Fig. 9: A TCP peer. For i = 1, 2, if this is PEER i, then SND := iTON and RCV := NTOi. All the states except i0, ..., i5, and End
are from the finite state machine in the TCP RFC [35]. The RFC diagram omits the implicit states i0, ..., i5, instead combining send
and receive events on individual transitions. In the RFC, Closed is called a “fictional state”, where no TCP exists. We add a state
End to capture the difference between a machine that elects not to instantiate a peer and a machine that is turned off. We label each
state s with a single atomic proposition si. Dashed transitions are timeout transitions, meaning they are taken when the rest of the
system deadlocks.
Given a property φ about TCP, we can formulate a threat model TM as follows, where we assume the adversary
can exploit the lower layers of a network and ask if the adversary can induce TCP to violate φ:
TM = (PEER 1 ‖ PEER 2 ‖ 1TON ‖ 2TON ‖ NTO1 ‖ NTO2, (NETWORK), φ) (8)
We consider the properties φ1, φ2, φ3, giving rise to the threat models TM1, TM2, TM3.
TM1: No Half-Closed Connection Establishment The safety property φ1 says that if PEER 1 is in Closed state,
then PEER 2 cannot be in Established state.
φ1 = G(Closed1 =⇒ ¬Established2) (9)
KORG discovers an attacker that spoofs the active participant in an active-passive connection establishment (see mes-
sage sequence chart in Fig. 10), as described in [15]. Note that our model does not capture message sequence numbers
and in the real world the attacker also needs to guess the sequence number of the passive peer.
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PEER 1 A PEER 2
Closed a0 Closed
Closed a0 Listen
SYN
Closed a1 i2
SYN ACK
Closed a2 SYN Received
ACK
Closed a4 Established
Fig. 10: Time progresses from top to bottom. Labeled arrows denote message exchanges over implicit channels. The property is
violated in the final row; after this recovery may begin.
TM2: Passive-Active Connection Establishment Eventually Succeeds The liveness property φ2 says that if it is
infinitely often true that PEER 1 is in Listen state while PEER 2 is in SYN Sent state, then it must eventually be true
that PEER 1 is in Established state.
φ2 = (GF(Listen1 ∧ SYN Sent2)) =⇒ FEstablished1 (10)
KORG discovers an attack where a SYN packet from PEER 2 is dropped. The corresponding attacker code is given in
the PROMELA language of SPIN in Fig. 11. The attacker in Fig. 11 also induces deleterious behavior not captured by
violation of φ2, where the system deadlocks in (SYN Sent,SYN Received).
Nto1 ! ACK; Nto2 ! ACK; 2toN ? SYN; /* ... recovery ... */
Fig. 11: Body of PROMELA process for a TM2-attacker with recovery generated by KORG. PEER 2 transitions from Closed state to
SYN Sent state and sends SYN to PEER 1. The attacker drops this packet so that it never reaches PEER 1. PEER 1 then transitions
back and forth forever between Closed and Listen states, and the property is violated. Because SPIN attempts to find counterexam-
ples as quickly as possible, the counterexamples it produces are not in general minimal.
TM3: Peers Do Not Get Stuck The safety property φ3 says that the two peers will never simultaneously deadlock
outside their End states. Let Si denote the set of states in Fig. 9 for PEER i, and S
′
i = Si \ {End}.
φ3 =
∧
s1∈S′1
∧
s2∈S′2
¬FG(s1 ∧ s2) (11)
For the problem with recovery, KORG discovers an attacker that selectively drops the ACK sent by PEER 1 as it
transitions from i0 to Established state in an active/passive connection establishment routine, leaving PEER 2 stranded
in SYN Received state, leading to a violation of φ3. This type of packet-loss-induced deadlock is not uncommon in
real-world TCP implementations, e.g. [39,40,38].
Performance Performance results for Case Study are given in Table 2. The discovered attackers either implement
known attacks or reproduce known bugs in real TCP implementations. Our success criteria was to produce realistic
attackers faster than an expert human could with pen-and-paper. We discovered attackers in seconds or minutes as
shown in Table 2.
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Property
Avg. Runtime (s)
Unique Attacker
Unique Attackers Found
∃ASP R-∃ASP ∃ASP R-∃ASP
φ1 0.32 0.49 7 5
φ2 0.45 0.48 5 5
φ3 876.74 2757.98 4 5
Table 2: For each property φi, we asked KORG to generate ten attackers with recovery, and ten without. We repeated this experiment
ten times, on a 16Gb 2018 quad-core Intel c© Coretm i7-8550U CPU running Linux Mint 19.3 Cinnamon. KORG may generate
duplicate attackers, so for each property (Column 1), we list the average time taken to generate a unique attacker without recovery
(Column 2) or with recovery (Column 3), and the total number of unique attackers found without recovery (Column 4) or with
recovery (Column 5). For example, for φ3, out of 100 attackers with recovery generated over the course of about 12 hours, five
were unique and 95 duplicates, meaning KORG took on average about 15 minutes per unique attacker. Instructions and code to
reproduce these results are given in the GitHub repository.
We chose TCP connection establishment for our case study because it is simple and well-understood. Across three
properties (two safety and one liveness), with and without recovery, KORG synthesized attackers exhibiting attack
strategies that have worked or could work against some real-world TCP implementations, modulo sequence numbers.
The synthesized attackers are simple, consisting of only a few lines of code, but our TCP model is also simple since we
omitted sequence numbers, congestion control, and other details. Moving forward, we want to apply KORG to more
complicated models and discover novel exploits.
6 Related Work
Prior works formalized security problems using game theory (e.g., FLIPIT [43], [25]), “weird machines” [9], attack
trees [47], Markov models [42], and other methods. Prior notions of attacker quality include O-complexity [8], ex-
pected information loss [37], or success probability [31,46], which is similar to our concept of ∀ versus ∃-attackers.
The formalism of [46] also captures attack consequence (cost to a stakeholder).
Nondeterminism abstracts probability, e.g., a ∀-attacker is an attacker with P (success) = 1, and, under fairness
conditions, an ∃-attacker is an attacker with 0 < P (success) < 1. Probabilistic approaches are advantageous when the
existence of an event is less interesting than its likelihood. For example, a lucky adversary could randomly guess my
RSA modulus, but this attack is too unlikely to be interesting. We chose to use nondeterminism over probabilities for
two reasons: first, because nondeterministic models do not require prior knowledge of event probabilities, but proba-
bilistic models do; and second, because the non-deterministicmodel-checking problem is cheaper than its probabilistic
cousin [44]. Nevertheless, we believe our approach could be extended to probabilistic models in future work. Katoen
provides a nice survey of probabilistic model checking [23].
Attacker synthesis work exists in cyber-physical systems [33,4,20,27,31], most of which define attacker success
using bad states (e.g., reactor meltdown, vehicle collision, etc.) or information theory (e.g., information leakage met-
rics). Problems include the actuator attacker synthesis problem [28]; the hardware-aware attacker synthesis problem
[41]; and the fault-attacker synthesis problem [5]. Defensive synthesis also exists [2].
Maybe the most similar work to our own is PROVERIF [7], which verifies properties of, and generates attacks
against, cryptographic protocols. We formalize the problem with operational semantics (processes) and reduce it to
model checking,whereas PROVERIF uses axiomatic semantics (PROLOG clauses) and reduces it to automated proving.
Another similar tool is NETSMC [49], a model-checker that efficiently finds counter-examples to security properties
of stateful networks. NETSMC is a model-checker, whereas our approach is built on top of a model checker, so in
theory our approach could be implemented on top of NETSMC.
Existing techniques for automated attack discovery includemodel-guided search [21,18] (including using inference
[10]), open-source-intelligence [48], bug analysis [19], and genetic programming [24]. The generation of a failing test-
case for a protocol property is not unlike attack discovery, so [30] is also related.
TCP was previously formally studied using a process language called SPEX [36], Petri nets [16], the HOL proof
assistant [6], and various other algebras (see Table 2.2 in [29]). Our model is neither the most detailed nor the most
comprehensive, but it captures all possible establishment and tear-down routines, and is tailored to our framework.
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This paper focuses on attacker synthesis at the protocol level, and thus differs from the work reported in [22] in
two ways: first, the work in [22] synthesizes mappings between high-level protocol models and execution platform
models, thereby focusing on linking protocol design and implementation; second, the work in [22] synthesizes correct
(secure) mappings, whereas we are interested in synthesizing attackers.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We present a novel formal framework for automated attacker synthesis. The framework includes an explicit definition
of threat models and four novel, to our knowledge, abstract categories of attackers.We formulate four attacker synthesis
problems, and propose solutions to two of them by program transformations and reduction to model-checking. We
prove our solutions sound and complete; sketches of these proofs are provided in Section 4. Finally, we implement our
solutions for the case of a centralized attacker in an open-source tool called KORG, apply KORG to the study of the
TCP connection routine, and discuss the results. KORG and the TCP case study are freely and openly available, so our
results are easy to reproduce.
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